

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 Theoretical/Conceptual Foundation**

##### **2.1.1 Defence Diplomacy**

Diplomacy in its general meaning refers to the application of relations between sovereign states through intermediate representatives located abroad or locally with a view to win people's hearts, change attitudes and perspectives and shape perceptions so that would be adversaries view each other differently (Berridge & James, 2003). According to Emelia, (2013, p.6) diplomacy is important on the international arena because it enables states to coexist peacefully, develop mutual respect and cooperate with each other regardless of differing national interests and values.

Pedrason, (2015, p. 16) defines diplomacy as the whole range of strategies and methods which may include political cooperation, economic, defence cooperation, culture, etc adopted by nations to develop mutual trust to the levels of cooperating with each other. Hence, it can be concluded that diplomacy entails the partial compromise of individual interests for the common good in order to accommodate each other in a win- win situation. Such an arrangement is strongly influenced by the levels of trust and goodwill existing among the parties involved. Perwita et al (eds) (2022, p.2) posits that DD is a strategy for establishing, improving, and maintaining military ties with other countries in order to contribute to the development of relations as well as the promotion of international peace and security.

Building upon diplomatic grounds, the small power states of Africa developed a cooperative relationship, the African Union, designed to promote collective security in the different aspects of life including economy,

political, social, culture, defence, etc. Attainment of one of the key objectives of the regional grouping depends upon the effective implementation of defence diplomacy for the purposes of achieving internal and regional peace and security. According to Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster (2004, p. 7) defence diplomacy activities include, but are not limited to:

- a. Multilateral and bilateral interactions between both military and civil defence officials at high levels;
- b. Multilateral and bilateral defence alliances and cooperation agreements;
- c. Secondment of defence attaches;
- d. Offering training services to foreign militaries;
- e. Advice and expertise on defence management, democratic defence systems and other technical fields;
- f. Ship visits, exchanges and contacts between military personnel and units;
- g. Assignment of the training teams;
- h. Exchanges of military and/or civilian personnel with foreign defence or armed forces;
- i. Providing foreign forces with military equipment and other material assistance;
- j. Military exercises and manoeuvres for training purposes at bilateral or multilateral levels; and
- k. Physical deployment of personnel and equipment for operations in support of foreign military forces.

### **2.1.2 Collective Security**

The term 'collective security' has been adopted as a principle during the period of the League of Nations. The Collective security system categorises international, regional or national threats to peace and security as enemies. To establish security within sovereign states, collective

security infiltrates from the inside. Every country has an inherent obligation preserve peace and security, regardless of where the threat arises within the system. Alternatively, collective security can be activated by a threatened nation which may request assistance from others while exercising its innate right to collective self-defence (Stefan Aleksovski., Oliver Bakreski, and Biljana Avramovska; 2014). The collective security system established by the UN Charter establishes normative, military and political prerequisites for the organization to be able to prevent acts of aggression, threats or use of force, or other actions that may lead to breach of peace.

Four principles form the basis of Collective security: first, all states are obliged to refrain from using force except in self-defence; second, they concur that peace is indivisible and that if one is attacked it means all have been attacked; third, they agree to band together to stop an attack and restore peace; and last, they pledge to donate towards the required material or human resources to constitute a security force to fight aggressors and re-establish peace (Rourke and Boyer; 1998).

According to the UNHLP (2004), there should be three tenets or presumptions supporting collective security today. The first is the ongoing requirement for all stake holders' collective responses across the board. Then there is the acknowledgment that some threats have the potential to be serious security concerns for the whole community. The responsibility to protect which is based on the understanding that some nations cannot or will not protect their own citizens deliberately or due to lack of capacity form the third tenet (UNHLP Report,2004:11). A fourth pillar, known as the Duty to Prevent, was developed by Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter in 2004. This pillar emphasizes the necessity of a coordinated military response to the threats presented by rogue regimes, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. It is this fourth pillar which forms the basis of this study as SADC nations took coordinated military action against terrorism in support of a member lacking the required capacity.

The contemporary awareness that, even though sovereign Governments have the responsibility for defending their own citizens against threats to peace and security, that obligation has to be assumed by the larger international community when they are unable or lack the capacity to do so (UNHLP Report, para.202). This entails making the choice of joining a system of collective security even though this requires governments to be ready to cede a sizable percentage of their sovereignty and national interests for the common good of the community at large. On a similar note, Welsh, (2002) acknowledges that:

“...there is a growing international consensus that, under certain circumstances characterized by massive human rights abuses, a legitimate case for armed intervention is emerging. So long as states can make the fundamental shift in thinking from sovereignty as authority; meaning, sovereignty as an unrivalled control over a delimited territory and the population residing within it, to sovereignty as responsibility; meaning, sovereignty as conditional on a state demonstrating respect for a minimum standard of human rights, then a norm of responsibility to protect will emerge. If this shift can be made, then armed force can be employed legitimately...” (Welsh, 2002: 511),

It is important to stress that democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law are the foundations of freedom and peace. The goal of democratic development at both the national and international levels was to uphold the rule of law. Modern state sovereignty now includes a responsibility component in addition to its right-based component. Only common confidence and good faith could serve as the foundation for collective security—belief in the rules by which it is regulated and good faith in the methods used to achieve it. With the conclusion of the cold war, it is crucial to prevent the onset or resurgence of new conflicts, including those involving terrorism, racial tension, ethnic conflict, border disputes and irredentist claims. (Fassbender, 2002).

Thus, it can be proposed that in view of the small power states of SADC, collective security can be understood as a collective arrangement in which members contribute to the best of their respective capacities towards joint responses to breaches and threats of peace and security within the grouping. The approach is based upon the realisation and acknowledgement of individual resource and capacity constraints requiring for united actions for the common good.

### **2.1.3 Défense Capacity Building**

One of the pillars of effective collective security is DCB among the members of the collective community. According to the Défense Security Cooperation Agency, capacity building is the process of enhancing an organization's or community's capacity to survive, adapt, and thrive in a rapidly changing world which involves creating and bolstering its capabilities in several areas. Organizations and their leaders are able to grow their competences and abilities through capacity building, which increases their potential to follow their interests. Institutional Capacity Building (ICB), a crucial component of CB, includes Security Cooperation (SC) initiatives which can assist partner nation efforts to enhance security sector governance and core management competencies required to successfully achieve common security goals. In order to provide what is required, broader, systemic factors must be examined and addressed. ICB aids allies and partners to comprehend the requirements, develop, employ, and sustain required capabilities, build forces, employ those capabilities in a responsible and effective manner in the pursuit of shared goals and adequately staff, maintain, and support the capabilities during their lifecycle until their retirement.

NATO (2021) defines defence capacity building (DCB) as “a range of activities in support of developing an indigenous security force, such as training, mentoring, partnering, monitoring and enabling.” DCB adds value to the security of the association by supporting partners in developing their

security capabilities and resilience. It can take many different forms, such as strategic advice on defence and security sector reform, training and instruction for local troops and institution-building, or aid in specialized fields like logistics or cyber defence.

For the purpose of this research, defence capacity building shall be viewed as a wide range of defence diplomacy activities aimed at developing the defence capacities of member states to enable them to deal with existing security threats. These DCB initiatives are usually reactionary in nature because of the inherent resource constraints in small power states which restrict their ability to commit scarce resources in anticipation of possible future threats which may or may not occur. Thus, linking the 3 concepts above it can be noted that collective security is implemented through defence diplomacy in order to facilitate defence capacity building thereby ensuring the attainment of national resilience.

#### **2.1.4 Small Power States**

The DCB patterns vary greatly depending on the classification of states. Super powers have the capacity to individually build their capacities without reliance on other states. However, this is not the case with small power nations which usually lack the internal resources for individual capacity building. Mozambique and its allies in SADC fall under the category of small power states within the international classification of nations. Different schools of thought have proffered differing definitions regarding small powers depending upon the factors under consideration. However, a common feature with most of the definitions is the shortage of capabilities and resources as determinants of international power and influence. The size of the population, the economy, military capabilities and size of territory have been used as variables Thorhallsson: (2006). Although population size is the most prevalent metric used to characterize minor powers, there is disagreement over the ideal population threshold for governments to be classified as small or intermediate powers. States

with populations up to 30 million people are occasionally classified as small, while most scholars define small states as those with populations of fewer than 10 or 15 million. Others, however, view size as a relative concept, with big powers having a significantly higher influence than tiny ones, and middle powers having a substantially greater influence (Morgenthau: 1972).

There is disagreement over the minimum population size required for states to be classified as minor or middle powers, despite the fact that population size is the most prevalent factor used to identify small powers. Nations with populations around 30 million people are occasionally classified as small, while the majority of scholars only count states with populations of 10 or 15 million or less as small. However, others view size as a relative concept, with the influence of large powers being perceived as much bigger and that of middle powers as substantially greater than that of minor powers (Morgenthau: 1972).

Thorhallsson (2006) offers a framework for the categorisation of nations that integrates many aspects. Variables like fixed population and territorial sizes, sovereignty size indicating how well the government manages key issues like borders and internal affairs is recognized; political size, which includes military and administrative capabilities, domestic cohesion, and consensus on foreign policy; economic size, measured by development, market size, and GDP; perceptual size, indicating internal and external actors perception of a state; and preference size, indicating the goals, aspirations, and priorities of local leaders concerning their part in international affairs. The notion of the small state is based upon available national capabilities and the manner they are used to project foreign policies while comparing them to the national capabilities of other countries. (Galal: 2020).

Over the years, small power states have generally been defined by three criteria. From the, when the idea of the state was based on hierarchy, The first criterion, spanning from the Westphalia Treaty in 1648

through the Versailles Treaty in 1919 based on practical qualities thereby concentrating on placing nations in the international hierarchy according to the components of their hard power, particularly the military one. Despite international legal equality between large and small states, minor states at this period were then referred to as satellite states. The definition of a small state was mixed with a variety of other terms, including those that are sometimes used interchangeably and other times separately, such as microscopic state, developing state, weak state, poor state, failed state, or least developed country. In the international world, this group of nations is the most fragile and impoverished (Katzenstein, 2003).

The second standard is academic and it considers size as measured according to population, area, and resources:

- a. Population: Despite the divergent opinions regarding the best way to count small power states, the majority viewpoint defined a small state as having population of between one and thirty million (Vital, 1971).
- b. Size: According to the UN, a small state is one that is "not more than 100,000 km<sup>2</sup>" (Shalaby, 2008). 85 states are small states, as measured by this criterion, according to UN data (28 European, 23 Asian, 16 Caribbean Americans, 16 Africa and 2 in Eurasian). (<http://cutt.us/6rzmw>).
- c. Resources: a small state has been defined as one that is unable to achieve security via its own means and that is dependent on others in order to provide security from external threats. As a result, it wants to sign bilateral agreements with stronger nations in order to ensure its protection and independence. (Rothstein: 1968)

Cognitive variables are the third criterion for determining small powers. It is concerned with changing perceptions in the classification of international units, wherein it is the decision-makers' perception of the country's national capacity or its classification in the international system

depending on its capacity. Hey (2003) argues that the smallness of the state is based on the leaders' view of the state's place in the international hierarchy. The leaders of the small state are those who are aware that they cannot change the international system either individually or collectively. These governments' leaders are aware that neither through coalitions nor through unilateral action are their nations able to change the global order. As a result, they modify their foreign policy in accordance with the goals and plans of the global order (Keohane: 1969).

In this study, the concept of small power states refers to an international class of nations characterised by constraints in national resources and capabilities which situation limits their ability to project their influence on the anarchical international arena. Resultantly they resort to collective action or alignment with major powers as a means of increasing their international influence.

#### **2.1.5 Defence Capacity Building Patterns of Small Powers**

A Small power is aware that relying only on its own resources won't provide security. Even while individuals are unable to change the international system on their own, they can change how it functions if they work together. Within great power's expansive array of military and political resources, a small power fills an optional and non-decisive role. As a result, alliances or strict neutrality are the policies that small powers tend to pursue. People who live in geopolitical areas that are essential to preserving a great power's standing in the international system tend to choose alliances. In an alliance, lesser powers often adhere to the guidance leader of the alliance, offer whatever assistance they can, and try to avoid offending it. Small nations tend to adopt neutrality when there is regional predominance and little chance of retribution.

Some small powers choose following or establishing links with great countries as a means of capacity enhancement. They prefer to build special relations with large powers, an example being the unique

relationship between the USA and Israel, which serves as a guarantee of Israel security and continued survival within a hostile international system. These ties allowed Israel to accomplish its goals, which include preventing the creation of a Palestinian state, preserving Israel's qualitative dominance in the Middle East, and protecting its security and survival (Abo Lila, 2017). However, such relations can become challenges when it comes to regional integration in cases where different regional players are aligned to competing/rivalry super powers. Cooperation, trust and close integration will be compromised as the small powers try to balance between appeasing their benefactors and regional integration. This is prominent in the toxic relationship developing within small powers aligned to the east (China/Russia) and those aligned to the Western block (USA and its allies).

As a small power nation, Mozambique lacked the defence capacity to deal with the terrorist problem in its Cabo Delgado province. The local security forces tried to quell the terrorist uprising but were overwhelmed due to lack of capacity in various aspects which include intelligence gathering, weapons, training, experience, strategy and tactics relevant for the threat. To mitigate these inadequacies while maintaining state sovereignty, the government initially engaged private security companies. However, these lacked the capacity to uproot the terrorists. Instead, the situation continued to worsen as the terrorists gained more ground and committed more atrocities such that the Mozambique authorities had no choice but to request for SADC intervention under the principle of collective security as provided for under Article 5 of the SADC Treaty of 1992 as read in conjunction with Article 2 of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security.

## **2.1.6 Terrorism and Counter-terrorism**

### **2.1.6.1 Terrorism**

According to Wisniewski, Jeremy (2008) terrorism is the usage of violence and distress for the attainment of ideological goals. This is usually in the form of intentional violence in times of peace or aimed at non-combatants, mostly civilians, in war situations. The term 'terrorism' is often used in the context of something that is morally wrong as it entails the deliberate abuse of human rights. Terrorism can be ascribed to individuals, groups or nations. Without deviating much deviation, Michael Walzer (2002) defined terrorism as "...the deliberate killing of innocent people, at random, to spread fear through a whole population and force the hand of its political leaders". However, there is generally lack of agreement on the definition of terrorism arising from differences in the point of focus and also the fact that the term is emotionally and politically charged as it is usually associated with the quest for self-determination and national liberation. With some focusing on defining it according to its methods, others focus on the expected aims, or the perpetrators. There is also a school of thought which argues that states cannot perpetrate terrorism (Jenny Teichman (1989). Thus, scholars who include Aust, Anthony (2010) argue that states are capable of terrorism against their own populace or other states. Bockstette, Carsten (2008) stressed the significance of the role played by the media in terrorism by ascribing terrorist activities to deliberate designs towards exploitation of the media as a force multiplier with the aim of attaining maximum possible publicity so as to stimulate the target audience.

The term terrorism can be used pejoratively as a means to denounce or abuse those of an opposing dispensation either political parties, regimes or non-state actors. In most cases, those who are called "terrorists" by their adversaries do not refer to themselves in this way; instead, they refer to themselves as freedom fighters, separatists, paramilitaries, liberators, guerrillas, revolutionaries, etc, or any other term

with a similar meaning. Terrorism is chosen as a tactic by individuals and groups due to a variety of reasons. It can directly force governments to concede to the requests made by the perpetrators; people can be coerced into accepting demands in order to avoid injury; attract attention to a given cause; inspire others to join and gain international recognition or sympathy. Collaborators are also targeted as intimidation against cooperating with the national security apparatus (Madigan, Michael: December 6, 2017).

Causes of terrorism vary according to different pushing motivations which may be social or political. These may be the quest for independence, pursuit of certain political philosophy, cultural and religious inclinations, grievances against government institutions and revenge among other factors. Terrorist attacks may be committed by one person, a group, or an entire nation. Covert or semi-clandestine national actors might also commit terrorist activities beyond the confines of a state of war. A prevalent perception of terrorism is that it is committed by small, clandestine units that are extremely inspired to further a specific cause. Terrorists will appear regular as well as act ordinarily up until they carry out their given goal so as to avoid being noticed. Thus, it has been argued that efforts to categorize terrorists based on their personalities, appearances, or sociological characteristics are useless. Nearly any regular individual would fit the terrorist's description of appearance and behaviour. (Mark Sageman, 2004).

#### **2.1.6.2 Counter-terrorism**

The method, military tactics, procedures, and policy used by states, the armed forces, law enforcement, the private sector, and intelligence organizations to stop or eradicate terrorism are all included in counter-terrorism. The purpose of a government's counterterrorism policy is to eliminate as well as subdue terrorists, institutions under their control, and the networks they are a part of so as to prevent them from using fear

and force to compel the state or the populace to behave in compliance with their objectives. The methodology, military tactics, procedures, and strategy used by states, the armed forces, enforcement agencies, the private sector, and intelligence organizations to stop or eradicate terrorism are all included in counter-terrorism. A state's motivation to using the tools of national authority to combat terrorism is called a counterterrorism strategy. The majority of counterterrorism tactics include bolstering internal intelligence including ordinary police forces. Intercepting communications and tracking down people are the main traditional operations. However, the scope of military and law enforcement operations has increased thanks to new technology (Stigall, Miller, and Donnatucci: October 7, 2019).

Political debate arises from the fact that domestic intelligence is frequently targeted at particular groups that are identified based on ethnicity or religion. Civil liberties concerns are raised when a population is being monitored extensively. The relevant government organizations must comprehend the origin, motive, techniques of preparation, and tactics of terrorist groups in order to decide on an effective course of action when terrorism is in the form of non-recurring incidence. The foundation of such preparation is sound intellect, together with a political and societal awareness of any issues that could possibly be resolved (Shaffer, Ryan: 2015).

Shaffer, Ryan (2015) argues that the security of cell-based systems presents a significant problem for counterintelligence because finding a covert supplier inside that cell is the ideal—yet virtually impossibly difficult—goal. Both monetary surveillance and communication interception could be useful. Each of these strategies must be weighed alongside reasonable expectations of privacy, though. Key to effective counter-terrorism strategy lies in addressing the root causes. Purely military or police operations alone may not be effective in eradicating terrorism as it is often based upon a strong ideological foundation.

Security forces operations can temporarily disturb but not fully stop or prevent future terrorism for example the U.S. operation in Afghanistan.

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the Plan of Action (A/RES/60/288) identifies 4 pillars as critical for effective counter-terrorism, namely; Addressing the factors that encourage the growth of terrorism; Initiatives towards prevention and combating terrorism; Measures to increase national capacities to detect as well as eradicate terrorism and to reinforce the UN system's involvement in doing so; and Measures to ensure that everyone respects human rights and the rule of law as the cornerstones of the battle against terrorism. The 4 pillars encompass the following key strategies:

- a. Advancing international legal cooperation in terrorism-related criminal cases and promoting the use of the international legal frameworks against terrorism;
- b. Adopting multifaceted strategy for combating violent extremism and radicalization that breed terrorism;
- c. Preventing and combating terrorism financing;
- d. Denying terrorists from using the Internet for their goals;
- e. Promoting conversation and co-operation on counter-terrorism concerns, in particular, through public-private partnerships between State authorities and the private sector (business community, industry), as well as civil society and the media;
- f. Strengthening national efforts to implement United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- g. Strengthening travel document security; and
- h. Promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in the context of counter-terrorism measures (United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism: 2006).

For the purposes of this study, terrorism is defined as any act deliberately designed to endanger the lives of civilians or non-combatants or to cause them significant bodily injury in order to intimidate a community or compel a government or an international organization to take a certain action or refrain from taking one. It can be perpetrated by an individual, a group or a nation. Counter-terrorism are any efforts aimed at eliminating terrorism in promotion of respect of human rights.

### **2.1.7 Theory of Peace**

The Theory of Peace seeks to proffer an understanding of the causes of war as a prerequisite for supporting sustainable peace. Proponents argue that conflict typically develops when structural factors that create the environment for violence collide with particular crises or windows of opportunity when violence can start. Individuals make the choice to use violence, including elites who decide when and how to use violent actors as well as line members who aid violent organizations. Low levels of contentment with the current state of affairs, optimism that the aggression is likely to succeed, and a lack of belief that the same ultimate objective can be attained through nonviolent methods are all factors that contribute to pressures towards war (One Earth Future: 2019).

The theory argues that there are numerous factors that support peace. Multiple factors that contribute to conflict seem to be influenced by structural interconnectedness (through commerce or other networks), economic progress, democracy, and the involvement of women. By fostering human development and sound governance, a global system that fosters peace must address the structural causes of conflict, avert crises and explosive issues from exploding, and offer legal frameworks for international participation and conflict resolution.

The Theory of Peace also holds that no single factor can be attributed to all violent conflicts. There are always a variety of influences that influence people's decision to use violence, whether we are talking

about conflict between or within nations, internationalized conflict, or combat that is sparked by the actions of one government against another. These include social forces and influences at the level of important decision-makers. Therefore, in order to achieve lasting peace, it is necessary to address issues related to economic growth, lifestyle quality, public trust, and attitudes toward violence. A system that minimizes the outbreak of violence, responds swiftly and effectively to breakouts of conflict before they escalate to large-scale war, while seeking to resolve the underlying causes of conflict is necessary to the development of a peaceful world. Economic growth, effective social service delivery across several areas, an open and accepting political system that prevents any group or identity from feeling excluded from system decisions, and some level of security institutions as a safety net against troublemakers are requirements for long-lasting peace at the intrastate level (<https://oneearthfuture.org/theory-peace>).

This study postulates that the Theory of Peace focuses on identifying and understanding the root causes of conflict as the means to solving any dispute. Having gained an understanding of the root causes, efforts can then be made to address them as a precursor to resolving the conflict itself. Attempts to resolve the conflict without addressing the root causes will not bring about enduring peace and security, it can only suppress the problem for a period of time before it resurfaces again at a later stage. Basing upon the Theory of Peace, this study shall endeavour to identify the root causes of the terrorist outbreak in Cabo Delgado and these shall be used as indicators to measure the extent to which SADC CB initiatives had been effective in restoring peace and security. The level of national resilience is a determining factor in the application of the Theory of Peace.

## 2.2 Relevant Past Researches

This section shall identify and discuss past researches conducted which have a bearing on the current research. The studies are analysed with regards to their areas of similarity and difference to the current research. They can also be used as reference material to provide a wider understanding of the phenomena under investigation as their respective main and sub-focus was directed on different aspects of the issue. The concept of CB is not very popular within the SADC community, even though it is a practised feature. It is not clearly delineated as a stand-alone concept but is usually conducted or discussed within the context of military assistance/intervention. The following are previous research thesis on the same phenomena or theme aligned to the current research:

- a. Research titled “Terrorism in Mozambique: Ansar Al-Sunna and International Actors” which was compiled by Göktuğ Sönmez I M. Enes Arslan in June 2021.
- b. Research titled “Terrorism, Insurgency, and Regional Stability: The Case of Mozambique” which was compiled by Rich Mashimbye in February 2022.
- c. Research titled “Evaluating the African Union’s Military Interventionist Role towards Conflict Management in Africa” which was compiled by Ndubuisi Christian Ani in 2014.
- d. Research titled “Rethinking African Union’s Capacity for Regional Conflict Management” which was compiled by Ndubuisi Christian Ani & Adeoye O. Akinola in 2015.
- e. Research titled “The Role of Regional Integration in Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution in Africa: The Case of African Union” compiled by Joram Mukama Biswaro in 2013.

**Table 2.1 Comparison of Past Research**

Researcher	Research Title	Similarity	Difference	Results
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Göktuğ Sönmez and M. Enes Arslan 2021	Terrorism in Mozambique: Ansar Al-Sunna and International Actors	Discussed the DCB role played by external actors which include SADC, UN and private security groups.	The discussion did not analyse the impact of the role played by external actors in capacity building the local security forces. It was mainly focused on the humanitarian aspect of the situation.	The AU is over reliant on donor funding for its operations. External actors pursue own interests under the cover of offering assistance.
Rich Mashimbye 2022	Terrorism, Insurgency, and Regional Stability: The Case of Mozambique	The article discusses the Ansar Al-Sunnah terrorist attacks in the Mozambican Cabo Delgado Province, and the terrorist activities implications on the stability of Southern Africa and the posture adopted by SADC in reaction to the security threat.	Focused on conceptually determining the classification of the outbreak between “insurgency” and “terrorism” as the basis for analysing the situation and its scope within Mozambique and the region. However, did not analyse the SADC interventions and their implications in	The conflict in Mozambique is a terrorist attack with regional security implications. SADC intervention was legally justified for regional stability.

			detail.	
Ndubuisi Christian Ani 2014	Evaluating the African Union's Military Interventionist Role towards Conflict Management in Africa	Evaluated the defence capacity building of the AU in response to security issues affecting regional peace and security through defence capacity building of affected member states. Restrictions in terms of expertise, resources, funds and political commitment also discussed.	The research focused on different case study areas, namely Libya, Sudan and Somalia.	There is a general trend to focus on the fight against terrorism from a military perspective instead of focusing on the root causes of the problem basing upon a comprehensive approach.
Ndubuisi Christian Ani & Adeoye O. Akinola 2015	Rethinking African Union's Capacity for Regional Conflict Management	Scrutinizes the AU's capacity to enforce peace and security in assistance to African states lacking internal defence capacity to deal with internal security threats. It analyses the implementation of interventionist mechanisms by the regional grouping.	Focuses on the case studies of AU's interventions in Libya, Somalia and Sudan.	The AU lacks the finance to sponsor its peace and security missions depending on external financial support from the G8, EU, UN, and states such as Canada, China, France, and US.


Joram Mukama Biswaro 2013	The Role of Regional Integration in Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution in Africa. The Case of African Union	Discussed regional integration and the complexities of defence capacity building for the small power nations of Africa	Discussed African capacity building in pursuit of peace and security at a broader level covering the initiatives of all the sub-regional organisations of the AU.	Historical colonial strings continue to hamper African integration. The small power African nations are monopolised, exploited and controlled by the developed world
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Source: Processed by Researcher (2022)

### 2.3 Thinking Framework

The thinking frameworks reflects the relationship among the inputs, processes, outputs and the expected endstate guiding the conduct of this research. Inputs are in the form of diplomatic engagements, policies, plans and resource mobilisation by the stackholders towards an expected endstate. The inputs are processed through theories and concept which include defence capacity building and collective security. The expected outputs should address the the terrorist situation through the adoption and implementation of Initiatives towards prevention and combat terrorism, measures to increase national capacities to detect as well as eradicate terrorism and measures to ensure that everyone respects human rights and the rule of law as the cornerstones of the battle against terrorism. Initiatives adopted should result in the restoration of peace and security through eradication of terrorism and the protection of human rights. This can only be attained through an effective national security apparatus capable of attaining high levels of national resilience. In this

regard, the development of an independent defence industry is of paramount importance. This is diagrammatically summarised below:



**Figure 2.1 Thinking Framework**

Source: Processed by Researcher, 2022