


## CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Theoretical Basis

The literature review in this research will explain the grand theory, middle theory, and application theory. The grand theory in this research is War/Warfare. Grand theory is a macro theory that underlies all the theories below it. It is said to be a grand theory because this grand theory is the basis for determining other theories at various levels. Middle theory as a mid-level theory that has a macro and micro focus of study, the middle range theory used in this research is Modern Warfare. The application in this research uses the theories of Strategy, Hybrid Warfare, Total Mobilization, International Conflict, Propaganda Theory, Invasion Theory. More details of the theoretical basis in this research can be seen as follows:



**Figure 2.1. Research Theory Foundation**  
Source: processed by researcher, (2023)

### **2.1.1 Theory of War**

Clausewitz (1989) explains that war consists of several elements, namely enemies, violence and goals. War is a battle on a large scope, where both parties involved in the battle will try to defeat each other by directing all the power they have. Thus, the enemy is one of the elements in war that must exist. The difference between war and other activities is the use of organized violence with the intention to force the enemy to follow the will of the attacker. Therefore, from the explanation according to Clausewitz, the next element is indicated, namely the use of "violence to defeat the enemy".

The violence referred to by Clausewitz (1989) is a tool to defeat the enemy. Tools can be divided into two, namely, physical tools and tools in ideas. Physical tools can mean the use of military and military weaponry to defeat the enemy. The tools in the form of ideas are no less important in the concept of war. The concept of ideas here is an idea that is instilled by certain parties in an effort to fight an interest both in terms of politics and military opponents. The next element of war is conquest. According to Clausewitz (1989): "war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." In relation to the previous element, the force referred to is the physical strength in war that aims to force the opponent to submit, while to impose our will on the enemy is the goal of imposing the will to be achieved. To achieve the goal, war is required to render the enemy helpless. To the extent that the enemy still has the capacity to survive, there is also a need to destroy it. It is a method that needs to be done to achieve the goal.

War according to Clausewitz is not only limited to activities carried out by the military, but also includes political activities or activities, thus war is considered a continuation of politics carried out by other methods. The function of the territory itself as an alternative to the doctrine of total war that

has taken root. Clausewitz's ideas only apply during times of war. In times of peace, the territorial function is no longer as a military emergency, but as a function of military intervention in the political world.

According to Clausewitz, the concept of the Trinity, which includes the elements of government, military, and people, is the main factor that causes war, failure or success, or also the absence of war, for this reason the composition of each element of the trinity must really be a unified whole. This is because the 3 variables affect each other. If there is a mismatch in one variable, it will affect other variables and ultimately have an impact on the success of the war.

Clausewitz further explained 3 categories of forces that are important in warfare, namely irrational and non-irrational forces, rationality. Irrational forces are traits that arise from forces related to emotions, hatred, hostility and violence. In other words, a high desire for war from the people. It is the people who want war by providing good moral support to the government and military when fighting in order to maximize victory. Non-irrational forces are the same as military power with its various components. The military plays a role in playing all forms of opportunities and possibilities accompanied by all its expertise which will then determine the success or failure of the war strategy that has been prepared. The military and its components have the task of executing, carrying out their duties and creating goals according to the wishes of the government at war, only the military has the capability and ability to be able to carry out these strategies and policies.

Third, the meaning of rationality is equated with the rational attitude of the government, especially in relation to war. The government is the main key that designs policies and strategies in warfare. In this case, political goals are the main basis for war. In the sense that war depends on the government and war will not occur if the government does not want it. The government as a regulator is required to have the ability to make war

strategies and policies. Of course, it must also pay attention to the reaction of the people and the military.

Clausewitz as the first person to provide the concept of Universal war, or called Total War. Clausewitz observed the war strategy used by Napoleon Bonaparte during the French revolution, where the war model was a new war model, a war that involved all components owned by the French Government. Not only did the war involve professional and trained soldiers, but ordinary people were also involved in the war either directly or indirectly. People who were directly involved as soldiers would be specially trained, as well as indirectly by providing all the support needed in the war. Not only the civilian population, but Napoleon also mobilized all the infrastructure owned by the community to increase the strength needed in war. War involves all nations and all available resources. Although war involves symmetrical forces, each belligerent will form alliances in order to obtain a balance of power, Clausewitz also assumed that in unlimited warfare, there would be battles carried out by small groups of personnel using unconventional means (Clausewitz, 2007).

In relation to the theme of this thesis, the above three elements of war will be used to identify the case of Russia's intervention in Ukraine. This thesis will identify the character of the enemy, violence and conquest specifically applied in the case under study.

### **2.1.2 Modern War**

The meaning of modern war refers to the process of modern warfare which is carried out non-militarily by focusing control on countries that carry out coalitions supported by developed countries with the aim of destroying certain countries, which use economic aspects, political aspects, ideological aspects, socio-cultural aspects and State security defense systems. (Hendra et al., 2021). The modern war system, the control exercised by the global coalition is very dominant if the interests are not accommodated properly, this will endanger the country. The current war is called an

intangible war, because it has many dimensions and is difficult to identify as a threat of war or not. War not only involves between countries, but also involves non-state actors (Kemhan, 2020).

Modern war as a form of centralized war, there are no restrictions on war as stated in the Westphalia treaty (Amsir, 2021), such as targeting politics. This so-called fourth generation war existed during the cold war. War is carried out using guerrilla methods or not bound by the terms of war, not organized, through rebellion, carried out suddenly and by infiltrating enemy territory.

Modern war is carried out by infiltrating and intervening from one country to another by targeting aspects of life such as the economy, politics, ideology, socio-culture, law, religion and defense and security. The threat of war in the form of physical threats will be minimal, but it is also necessary to be aware because it can happen at any time. Types of modern war include:

- a. Asymmetrical Warfare, as the development of conventional warfare consisting of aspects of trigatra and pancagatra. This war includes several aspects, namely: geography, demography, natural resources, ideology, politics, economy, social and culture (Pranoto., 2015).
- b. Hybrid War is a political war by collaborating conventional war, irregular war and technological war. Military and non-military methods involving physical and psychological, including military, political, economic, social attacks by using technological sophistication.
- c. Cyber War is a war that utilizes information technology (Indrajit, 2000), both attacking and defending against attacks. The purpose of this attack is to exploit all information, spy, outwit the enemy, track information systems and inhibit all enemy activities.
- d. Proxy War which is a war with the term extension of hands, which occurs between confronting parties by utilizing third parties.

This is done because it will be a big risk and fatal if the war is carried out directly. Usually other actors who become third parties are non-state actors such as mass organizations, NGOs and so on.

This study uses the theory of modern war, which is a non-military war from a developed country with the aim of destroying certain countries in the fields of ideology, politics, social culture and security defense. Modern war is also considered as the control of a country that conducts a global coalition spearheaded by a large country against other countries that are considered to endanger the country. The war between Russia and Ukraine is a modern war conducted by Russia in annexing Crimea. Modern warfare includes hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, proxy warfare and cyber warfare.

### **2.1.3 Strategy**

Strategy Theory is a theory that prioritizes goals, methods, and facilities. Strategy will always correlate with a method that utilizes existing facilities to achieve goals (Smith & Stone, 2011). According to Strategic theory, decision-making will depend on how to assess the situation of the opponent faced, thus the effectiveness of the strategy will change in line with the level of change in the opponent (Caliskan, 2019). Strategic theory has a more specific focus on state actors, the premise of strategic theory is an art to develop all national power (political, economic, socio-psychological, and military power) of a country with the aim of creating an impact to protect and support national interests (Yarger, 2006). The use of strategy theory is not limited to the military field, but can be used in other types (Smith, 2011).

Sun Tzu, states that the effectiveness of a strategy will depend on the method of choosing the stages in determining the strategy. The stage starts from the initial analysis, then determines the opponent's weakness, then the strategist makes a counter-strategy to exploit the opponent's weakness. According to Tzu, the most important thing to choose a strategy

is to determine a counter strategy to the opponent's strategy, the success of the actor in exploiting the weaknesses of the opponent's strategy, then the strategy that has been implemented will be effective (Meiser et al., 2021).

The second point is that a strategy is said to be effective if a strategy is able to attack and manipulate the opponent's psychology. Furthermore, Clausewitz stated that the strategy would be considered effective if the actor was able to determine from the start what type of war would be started. This is done by controlling the pattern of war, actors can easily manipulate the center of gravity of warfare, so that it will benefit the actor while harming the opponent (Meiser et al., 2021).

Furthermore, Smith stated that the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of a strategy is judged by how actors utilize all resources and these resources are used as a means to achieve the desired goals. However, it must also balance all resources with the existing conditions, this needs to be done so that the strategy implemented is more efficient (Smith & Stone, 2011).

The use of strategy theory is relevant to the research for the basic reason that the State of Ukraine chose a war strategy to deal with the conflict of annexation of the area on the Crimean Peninsula from the application of war strategies carried out by the Russian side in achieving their main interests in this conflict, namely annexing or annexing the Crimean Peninsula area from the sovereign territory of Ukraine.

In its development, the concept of strategy must continuously undergo evolution, considering the varied opinions and definitions of strategy among individuals. One perspective on strategy, as articulated by Liddell Hart, portrays it as the art or skill of organizing and utilizing military means to achieve the ultimate goals of policy. Applying this concept to the context of total mobilization in Ukraine, total mobilization strategy can be seen as a tool used by Ukraine to achieve specific objectives in facing complex situations. Total mobilization can be viewed as a step involving the

science and art of determining goals (ends), formulating courses of action (ways), and deciding the means involving all available potential and resources.

In the Ukrainian context, the essence of total mobilization strategy is related to decision-making regarding strategic elements such as objectives (ends), ways of acting (ways), and means (means). The management of these elements becomes an integral unity to achieve the desired goals, such as efforts to maintain Ukraine's sovereignty and national security. Thus, Ukraine's total mobilization strategy reflects the adaptation and application of evolving strategic concepts in accordance with the context and demands of the situation.

Dalam perkembangannya, konsep strategi harus senantiasa mengalami evolusi dilihat dari pendapat dan definisi mengenai strategi yang bervariasi di antara individu-individu. Salah satu pandangan mengenai strategi, seperti yang diutarakan oleh Liddell Hart, menggambarkan strategi sebagai seni atau keterampilan dalam mengatur dan memanfaatkan sarana militer untuk mencapai tujuan akhir kebijakan. Menerapkan konsep ini pada konteks total mobilisasi Ukraina, strategi total mobilisasi dapat dianggap sebagai alat yang digunakan oleh Ukraina untuk mencapai tujuan tertentu dalam menghadapi situasi yang kompleks. Total mobilisasi dapat dilihat sebagai langkah yang melibatkan ilmu dan seni dalam menentukan tujuan (ends), merumuskan cara bertindak (ways), dan menentukan sarana prasarana (means) yang melibatkan seluruh potensi dan sumber daya yang ada.

Dalam konteks Ukraina, esensi strategi total mobilisasi terkait dengan pengambilan keputusan terhadap elemen-elemen strategis, seperti sasaran (ends), cara bertindak (ways), dan sarana (means). Pengelolaan elemen-elemen ini menjadi suatu kesatuan integral untuk mencapai tujuan yang diinginkan, seperti dalam upaya menjaga kedaulatan dan keamanan nasional Ukraina. Dengan demikian, strategi total mobilisasi Ukraina

mencerminkan adaptasi dan penerapan konsep strategi yang terus berkembang sesuai dengan konteks dan tuntutan situasional.

#### **2.1.4 Hybrid Warfare**

Hybrid Warfare is a strategy of combining forms of conflict threats, which include conventional warfare and irregular warfare, which involves state and non-state actors, including information media companies (Jitka Richterova, 2015). This Hybrid Strategy is a terminology, where traditional warfare tactics and general warfare are interdependent with one another (Lestari 2012).

Hybrid Warfare is a war strategy by collaborating traditional warfare and modern warfare (Najzer, 2020). All conventional, non-traditional warfare instruments can be used by State/non-State actors when a conflict occurs (Fridman et al, 2019). The application of this hybrid war strategy requires the interaction of instruments of power with conventional/non-conventional tools of subversion which are then combined to exploit the opponent's weaknesses (Ilbiz & Kaunert, 2021).

Hybrid Warfare Strategy theory explores how modern conflicts have undergone a shift from traditional conventional warfare models to more complex and multifaceted forms of warfare, which include both military and non-military elements, and involve both state and non-state actors. The concept of Hybrid Warfare Strategy and how this theory is applied in the context of the Ukraine-Russia conflict starts from its concept and strategy. Hybrid Warfare Strategy is a modern warfare approach that involves a combination of various elements, including military, political, economic, information, propaganda and other non-military elements. The goal is to create uncertainty, confuse and weaken the opponent in ways that cannot be anticipated. Such conflicts often exploit the gaps between military and non-military forces, and combine overt and covert actions.

This Hybrid warfare strategy is categorized as non-traditional warfare because it does not only use the military when facing conflict / war, but also

includes non-military in the form of non-physical. This aspect is able to cause loss and damage to the opponent directly without carrying out military attacks (Fajar, 2018).

Examples of hybrid warfare are mysterious non-military attacks or such as offensive cyber attacks, utilizing the movements of a non-state armed actor such as sparatis, launching psychological attacks using doctrine or propaganda. Psychological attacks with propaganda will have a very bad impact on the opponent (R. Johnson, 2018). Russia, which is a superpower, has the privilege of a country that wants to use hybrid warfare. Russia is much more advantaged because Russia is a super power country. (Rusnáková, 2017).

The Application of Hybrid Warfare Theory in the Context of the Ukraine-Russia Conflict states that the Ukraine-Russia Conflict is a clear example of the application of Hybrid Warfare Strategy. Russia has used various elements of this strategy to achieve its geopolitical goals in Ukraine. Some relevant aspects in this context include Limited Military Operations where Russia openly supported separatist groups in Eastern Ukraine with limited military forces. This created uncertainty and a complex civil war. Next Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns by Russia which has launched an aggressive propaganda campaign, including the spread of fake news, to influence public opinion and damage Ukraine's reputation. In addition, Cybernetic Operations which are cyber-attacks linked to Russia have taken place, including attacks on infrastructure and communication systems. Proxy Conflicts where Russia provides military and logistical support to separatist groups in Eastern Ukraine as a form of proxy conflict. And, Diplomatic Campaigns, where Russia has used diplomacy to gain international support, claiming that they are not involved in the conflict.

This research uses hybrid warfare theory because the war uses a combination of conventional/non-conventional military between state/non-state actors. Conventional forces still need the military to fight the enemy. In other words, the success of military attacks must be equally balanced

with political outcomes. The concept of hybrid warfare is a strategy carried out by the Russian State in dealing with its conflict with the Ukrainian State, especially in the conflict over the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula area.

### **2.1.5 Total Mobilization**

The theory of total mobilization was initiated by Ernst Jünger, a German intellectual, in the 1920s and 1930s. Total mobilization, as articulated by Jünger, refers to the concentration of the energies of the 'people' into a self-preserving unity, with its total character being preordained for the order of the situation of peace. This concept is not limited to military terms but captures the quality of power in demanding the concentration of energies for both production and destruction, indicating a new rhythm through which power claims universal mastery in the organization and rationalization of production and destruction alike. Jünger's original analyses of the relationship between war, destruction, organization, and technology can be found in his works "Copse 125," "Total Mobilisation," and "The Worker. Dominion and Form". Total Mobilization Theory is a highly relevant framework in the context of research on "Ukraine's Total Mobilization Against Hybrid Warfare Strategy to Counter Russian Invasion." The theory provides a deep understanding of how Ukraine coordinated all aspects of its national power to counter the Russian invasion. Below is an explanation of the Total Mobilization concept, the history of its use, and how Ukraine adapted it in the context of hybrid warfare.

The concept of Total Mobilization is a concept derived from the experiences of the first and second world wars. It refers to a state's full effort to mobilize all its national resources and potential, both military and non-military, to achieve war objectives. It includes mobilization of manpower, economy, technology, resources, and political and social support. Total Mobilization creates synergy between all elements of national power to enable optimal performance in the face of external threats. The concept of

Total Mobilization was first used extensively during World War I and became more famous during World War II. At that time, countries involved in the war mobilized their entire society and resources to support the war effort. For example, the United States in World War II saw total mobilization as an approach that allowed the full shift of the civilian economy to war production, increased industrial production, and the use of human resources in various aspects of the war.

Ernst Jünger understood mobilization as "the conversion of life into energy. In other words, there is a certain force or power within each individual that, if properly concentrated, will produce productive results. Jünger believed that mobilization was already underway in Post-World War I German society, born out of the technological advances of modernity and industrialism's huge contribution to the war effort. Consequently, he found that in the modern urban and factory environment, there was an increasing disintegration of autonomous subjectivity, i.e. the subject's environment codified and disciplined him to think and move more as a mass than as an individual; the modern subject was more an object/part of a larger whole. (Costea and Kostas Amiridis, 2017)

In Jünger's vision of total mobilization, no energy can escape its codification and discipline; all forces must be harnessed to support the "war effort". The important thing to remember about total mobilization is the full integration of the individual in the war effort. It is not just the subject's physical and technical capacities that must be harnessed for the Cause, but the Cause must penetrate to his or her "essence"; mobilization for the Cause is not what a person does, but who he or she is at the core of his or her identity. Although to a certain extent technological advancements may make individuals have a more mass mentality, Jünger's assertion of limiting "individual freedom" to speed up mobilization suggests that the process is not as efficient as he would like to portray; there is something in the individual that resists attempts at total integration. In other words, some

stubborn individuals may need to be forced to believe in the cause. (Costea and Kostas Amiridis, 2017)

In the Ukrainian context, the application of Total Mobilization became very relevant in the face of the Russian invasion. Ukraine must coordinate all of its national forces to effectively counter the threat, including in hybrid warfare. Ukraine adapted this concept in several ways, including Manpower Mobilization. Ukraine mobilized its population to participate in a volunteer defense force. This includes civilians willing to fight against a Russian invasion, which is an important form of labor mobilization in the context of hybrid warfare. Then by way of Economic Mobilization, where Ukraine sought to strengthen its economy by measures such as economic diversification and seeking foreign investment. This is intended to reduce Ukraine's dependence on Russian resources and create a stable foundation for its defense and development.

Next comes Technological Mobilization, as Ukraine invests in technological advancements, including cybersecurity, to protect its infrastructure from potential cyberattacks that could be used by Russia in a hybrid war with this mobilization. Next Diplomatic Mobilization, where Ukraine actively engages in diplomatic efforts to mobilize regional and international alliances, seek support for sanctions against Russia, and raise awareness of the continuing threat to its sovereignty and lastly through Societal Mobilization, where Ukraine should focus on developing societal cohesion and resilience by encouraging national unity, inclusiveness, and common goals in the face of Russian aggression.

Overall, Ukraine adapted the Total Mobilization concept in a way that allowed them to effectively deal with hybrid warfare. This includes coordinating all aspects of national power, including military and non-military aspects, to counter the Russian invasion and safeguard their sovereignty. Total Mobilization theory provides a relevant framework for the understanding of how Ukraine organizes and optimizes their national resources and potential in the face of complex and multifaceted threats.

This research uses the concept of Total mobilization that Ukraine did in the face of Russia. The overwhelming strength of Ukraine's resistance came from total mobilization throughout society. Millions of citizens did their part. A vibrant network of civil society and volunteer organizations delivered aid to displaced families and children and sent support to military units on the front lines. Ukraine remained resolute in resisting Russian aggression because it adopted a 'total defense' approach, combining military and civilian components. In the first days of the war, more than 100,000 people volunteered to join territorial defense units. They provided massive reinforcements to the local police or carried out armed resistance to the Russian invasion themselves. Many later joined the armed forces.

### **2.1.6 Propaganda**

Propaganda is a series of messages that only influence the opinions and behavior of people and groups of people. According to Edward L. Bernays in his book *Propaganda*, "Modern propaganda is a consistent and enduring effort to create or shape events to influence public relations with a company, idea, or group" (Bernays 1928: 11). For Bernays, propaganda is already part of democratic political culture, where propaganda is one of the realities of how state elites gain and hold their power over democratic societies. Bernays explains this in the opening of his book *Propaganda* (1928): "The conscious and intelligent manipulation of organized habits and mass opinion is an essential element in a democratic society. Those who manipulate these invisible mechanisms of society form the invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are organized, our thoughts are molded, our tastes are shaped, our ideas are suggested to us to a large extent by people we have never heard of. This is the logical outcome of the way our democratic society is organized. Large numbers of human beings must cooperate in this way if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society."

Bernays' definition of propaganda is similar to that offered by Harold D. Lasswell, who defined propaganda as "the manipulation of symbols" with the aim of "influencing attitudes toward controversial matters" (Lasswell, 1968). Then in his writing *Politics, Who Gets What, When, How* Lasswell explains that elites use propaganda through symbols or channels in a repetitive and diversionary manner that is capable of eliciting the desired communal action. The effort is to achieve the desired emotional change in the population (Lasswell 1936).

There are two types of propaganda, namely sociological and political propaganda. Political propaganda works through specific appeals that are relatively short-term. In practice, they involve the government, influential groups or parties to achieve their goals. On the other hand, sociological propaganda is sustainable and spreads into the economic, social and political areas of society (Chairun, 2017).

Cangara (2016), divides propaganda into three types, namely:

- a. White Propaganda, which is propaganda carried out by dividing corroborating information based on its source.
- b. Gray Propaganda, which is propaganda carried out by unclear groups in order to confuse other people's minds.
- c. Black Propaganda, which is propaganda carried out to bring down the morale/values of the opponent with techniques without ethics and tend to think one-sidedly.

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis is a concept in international relations created in the years between World War I and II to help detect and analyze propaganda, namely in 1937 in the United States. It was founded by Yale University. The Institute of Propaganda Analysis claims that the seven elements of propaganda techniques are name calling, glittering generalizations, transfers, testimonials, plain folks, card stacking, and bandwagons. (Schiffrin, 2022).

Propagandists use a tactic known as "name calling" where they use derogatory imagery in their messages to disparage a person, a group, or a

concept. The goal is to discredit a person or group, or even a particular idea, philosophy, or ideology, so that the target of the propaganda will also think badly of the person or group. Glittering Generalities in short, this tactic is the opposite of name-calling. The Glittering Generalities technique, unlike the Name Calling technique, uses terms with positive connotations to give a favorable impression of a person or group in the propagandist's mind. This tactic seeks to persuade the recipient of propaganda to accept the information conveyed by the propagandist as true, without having to re-evaluate whether it is a hoax or a lie.

Propagandists use the authority, support, and authority of an object that is generally considered and trusted by a wide audience as a means of transfer. The goal is to promote the propaganda agenda so that the intended audience can believe it easily. Propagandists use testimonial strategies by quoting statements or testimonies from individuals or groups that are well-known in the wider community. Presidents, heads of the UN Security Council, ministers, and even famous artists are examples of such figures. Propagandists use Plain Folks as a strategy to highlight how straightforward propaganda is, showing the innocence of the propagandist. The use of this strategy really requires psychological expertise by appealing to the sympathy and empathy of the propaganda target.

Card stacking is a propaganda tactic that highlights the positive aspects of someone or anything that the propagandist wants to highlight and prove. To avoid focusing on the actual facts, propagandists try to rely on facts that have already been collected. This dissemination strategy is more effective. In addition to the above methods, propagandists can create problems to divert attention from the real issue. The last strategy is Bandwagon. Propagandists use community identity as a propaganda tool in this strategy. Propagandists use mass media and events that attract large numbers of people to distribute their propaganda directly to the intended audience. In addition, propagandists create issues that can attract audiences to attend events that will be used to further the cause. This

strategy aims to gather as many supporters as possible to make minority groups easy propaganda targets. (Schiffrin, 2022).

This research uses the theory of Propaganda in the Ukrainian Russian Conflict because propaganda communication spreads to the public because it is assisted by social media coverage with today's sophisticated technological developments. Social media coverage in an armed conflict can provide political perceptions to its readers, so that they can voice or follow the narratives built by the conflicting countries so that the news is accepted by the public. The governments of both Russia and Ukraine require local media to use official government and pro-invasion narratives in the domestic environment. This is a move that is considered propaganda to maintain the government's popularity.

## **2.2 Previous Research**

Findings from previous research have significant relevance in the development of a comprehensive strategy to implement Ukraine's Total Mobilization concept in the Face of Hybrid Warfare Against Russian Invasion. Through an in-depth review of previous studies covering history, socio-political dynamics, and tactics employed, this study has provided valuable insights to effectively engage this conflict. The findings highlight the importance of addressing the root causes of the conflict, fostering inclusive governance, promoting socio-economic development, and encouraging dialogue and reconciliation among diverse stakeholders.

Furthermore, this research confirms the need for cooperation between security forces, local communities and government agencies to ensure the successful implementation of Ukraine's Total Mobilization Strategy, especially in the face of propaganda challenges during hybrid warfare. Based on lessons learned from previous research, this comprehensive strategy aims to dampen aggressor activities, improve community welfare and security while maintaining national security and the country's territorial integrity.

Deborah Sanders, (2023), published in *Defense & Security Analysis* journal, Volume 39, in 2023 conducted research with the title of research *Ukraine's Third Wave of Military Reform 2016-2022- Building A Military Able to Defend Ukraine Against the Russian Invasion*. The article explores an important and often overlooked element of Ukraine's ability to defend itself against a Russian invasion in February 2022, namely the adoption of a modified military reform model from the mass-focused western military reform model and building an interoperable and NATO-style trained military. The research findings show that Ukraine's military reforms since 2016, in particular the focus on Command and Control, the development of the NCO Corps and Special Forces and clear procurement priorities have created the enabling conditions for the development of a flexible and adaptable military force, capable of limiting Russian success on the battlefield and taking the fight to the enemy. Despite this progress, however, a recurring problem facing the Ukrainian military, which is likely to continue in the future, is how to balance ongoing needs against the urgent need for military modernization.

In terms of similarity, both the mentioned article/research and this qualitative study acknowledge the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its impact on the country. Both recognize the need for Ukraine to respond effectively to the hybrid warfare tactics employed by Russia. The main differences lie in the focus and scope of the research. Sanders' article/research is more centered on the efforts of military reform in Ukraine and their impact on defense capabilities, while this qualitative study adopts a broader perspective by examining the total mobilization's impact on various sectors of Ukrainian society and evaluating the evolution of Russia's hybrid warfare strategy.

Sascha, Dominik Dov Bachmann, Dries Putter and Guy Duczynski (2023) examines with the title of research *Hybrid warfare and disinformation: A Ukraine war perspective* (Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd, Policy. 2023; Vol. 14:858–

869). The article provides insights into the lessons learned from Ukraine in dealing with hybrid warfare and disinformation. It emphasizes the need for a comprehensive defense strategy that encompasses political, diplomatic, economic, military, technical, and scientific initiatives. The importance of resilience, awareness, and rapid response in countering influence operations and information disorder is highlighted, along with the suggestion to establish interagency coordination and utilize private sector expertise. The article also discusses the use of disinformation campaigns as part of information warfare, the integration of government and civilian efforts, and the concept of hybrid warfare and its use of non-military tactics. Additionally, it explores the use of misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information as tools of information warfare in the context of the Russo-Ukraine war.

Sasha's and friend article/research focuses on the lessons learned from Ukraine in dealing with hybrid warfare and disinformation. It emphasizes the need for a comprehensive defense strategy that encompasses political, diplomatic, economic, military, technical, and scientific initiatives. The article also discusses the use of disinformation campaigns as part of information warfare, the integration of government and civilian efforts, and the concept of hybrid warfare and its use of non-military tactics. My research focuses on the impact of total mobilization efforts on various sectors of Ukrainian society, the effectiveness of Ukraine's response to Russia's hybrid warfare tactics, and the evolution of the hybrid warfare strategy used by Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. It aims to comprehensively explain the evolution of the hybrid war strategy used by Russia and evaluate its impact on Ukrainian society.

The similarities between the two include the focus on hybrid warfare and its impact on Ukraine. Both also address the strategies and tactics used in hybrid warfare, as well as the impact on society and government institutions. However, your research specifically delves into the impact of total mobilization efforts on various sectors of Ukrainian society, which is not explicitly addressed in the previous article.

Johann Schmid in his research article "Hybrid warfare on the Ukrainian battlefield: developing theory based on empirical evidence" published in *Baltic Security Journal* (2019), volume number of 5(1) discusses the specific nature of hybrid warfare, particularly in the context of the conflict in and around Ukraine and with Russia. It argues that hybrid warfare is essentially a strategic matter characterized by three key tendencies and their orchestration within a hybrid 'grand strategy'. These tendencies include focusing the decision of the war/conflict on a broad spectrum of non-military centers of gravity, operating in the shadow of various interfaces against specific vulnerabilities of the opponent, and the creative combination and parallel use of different civilian and military means and methods. The article also emphasizes the need to improve the common and comprehensive understanding of hybrid forms of warfare as a precondition for common and comprehensive action in defense and response.

The similarities Focus on Hybrid Warfare: Both the article and my research focus on hybrid warfare, with your research specifically aiming to comprehensively explain the evolution of hybrid war strategy used by Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. Impact on Ukrainian Society: Both works aim to assess the impact of hybrid warfare on Ukrainian society, including the civilian population, military personnel, and government agencies. The differences both study lies on Problem Formulation, while the article by Johann Schmid focuses on defining the nature of hybrid warfare and its characteristics, my research has specific problem formulations related to the impact of total mobilization efforts and the effectiveness of Ukraine's response to Russia's hybrid warfare tactics. Research Objective, my research has a specific objective to comprehensively explain the evolution of hybrid war strategy used by Ukraine to fight against Russia invasion and evaluate its impact on Ukrainian society, while the article by Johann Schmid focuses on developing a theory based on empirical evidence regarding the nature of hybrid warfare.

Nicholas Marsh (2023) conducted research on *Responding to Needs: Military Aid to Ukraine During the First Year After the 2022 Invasion*. This article analyzes the provision of military aid to Ukraine during the first year after the 2022 Russian invasion and explains why it was more effective than other examples. The results show that aid providers placed more emphasis on equipment than training, a viable option as Ukraine had already established a high level of combat skills and military organization. The article argues that the specific aspects of military aid to Ukraine that led to its impact were the quality and quantity of equipment provided, good communication and coordination between Ukraine and the countries providing aid, and that Ukraine's defense institutions and government were able to manage the aid provided.

The similarity between these two studies lies in their focus on the military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, particularly the 2022 Russian invasion. Both studies assess the effectiveness of Ukraine's response to the invasion and consider the impact of the conflict on various sectors of Ukrainian society. However, the main difference lies in the emphasis of this study on Ukraine's total mobilization efforts and their impact on various sectors of society, while the Marsh article focuses more on the provision of military aid to Ukraine and its impact on Ukrainian defense capabilities. The Marsh article also discusses the attrition strategy employed by both parties. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of total mobilization on Ukrainian society, whereas the goal of the Marsh article is to explain the evolution of the hybrid warfare strategy used by Russia in its invasion of Ukraine.

Albina Starodubtseva (2021) conducted research on *Russian Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine: with the title *Russian Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine: Comparative Analysis of Two Cases and Identification of Critical Elements in the Successful Application of Hybrid Tactics**. This research examines the concept of Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine, specifically focusing on two cases: the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The

research aims to compare these two cases and identify the essential elements in the successful application of hybrid tactics. It also proposes recommendations to improve the state's ability to deal with hybrid attacks. The findings of this research reveal that despite a set of common factors, the different success rates and outcomes of the two cases are due to the fact that the successful use of the full spectrum of hybrid warfare, is actually tied not only to a number of prerequisites but also to the specific favorable features of the conflict zone and some critical elements. Although hybrid tactics vary depending on the country and region, they are built by exploiting the enemy's vulnerabilities, shortcomings of its political system, governance, economy, military environment, and society, which to a certain degree can characterize any country. By considering the various domains where attackers wage hybrid warfare, the most exploited fault lines, and the inherent weaknesses of the target state, this thesis proposes recommendations to improve the state's ability to deal with hybrid attacks.

The similarity between this study and Starodubtseva's research lies in their focus on the hybrid warfare strategy employed by Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. Both studies aim to understand the evolution of this strategy and its impact on Ukraine. The difference, however, lies in the specific focus and objectives of each study. This study centers on Ukraine's total mobilization efforts and their impact on various sectors of Ukrainian society, including the civilian population, military personnel, and government institutions. Its objectives also involve evaluating the effectiveness of Ukraine's response to Russia's hybrid warfare tactics. On the other hand, Starodubtseva's research focuses on comparing the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine to identify critical elements in the successful implementation of hybrid tactics. This research also provides recommendations to enhance a country's capability in facing hybrid attacks.

**Table 2.1 Comparison of Past Research**

<b>No</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Aim</b>	<b>Similarities / Differences</b>
1	Deborah Sanders (2023)	Ukraine's Third Wave of Military Reform 2016-2022- Building A Military Able to Defend Ukraine Against the Russian Invasion	The aim of this research/article is to discuss Ukraine's military reform efforts from 2016 to 2022 and how they have contributed to the country's ability to defend itself against the Russian invasion. The article also highlights the challenges Ukraine has faced in balancing the need for a large standing force with the need for military modernization.	In terms of similarities, both the article/research and your qualitative research acknowledge the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its impact on the country. They both recognize the need for Ukraine to respond effectively to the hybrid warfare tactics employed by Russia. The main difference lies in the focus and scope of the research. The article/research primarily focuses on Ukraine's military reform efforts and their impact on defense capabilities, while your qualitative research takes a broader perspective, examining the impact of total mobilization on various sectors of Ukrainian society and evaluating the evolution of Russia's hybrid war strategy.
2	Sascha, Dominik Dov Bachmann, Dries Putter and Guy Duczynski (2023)	Hybrid warfare and disinformation: A Ukraine war perspective	The aim of this research/article is to provide insights and analysis on the lessons learned from Ukraine in dealing with hybrid warfare and disinformation. It emphasizes the need for a comprehensive defense strategy that	The similarities focus on hybrid warfare and its impact on Ukraine. Both also address the strategies and tactics used in hybrid warfare, as well as the impact on society and government institutions. However, my research specifically delves into the impact of total mobilization efforts on various sectors of Ukrainian society, which is not explicitly addressed in the previous article.

			encompasses political, diplomatic, economic, military, technical, and scientific initiatives.	The main differences Sasha's and friend article/research focuses on the lessons learned from Ukraine in dealing with hybrid warfare and disinformation. It emphasizes the need for a comprehensive defense strategy that encompasses political, diplomatic, economic, military, technical, and scientific initiatives. The article also discusses the use of disinformation campaigns as part of information warfare, the integration of government and civilian efforts, and the concept of hybrid warfare and its use of non-military tactics. My research focuses on the impact of total mobilization efforts on various sectors of Ukrainian society, the effectiveness of Ukraine's response to Russia's hybrid warfare tactics.
3	Johann Schmid (2019)	Hybrid warfare on the Ukrainian battlefield: developing theory based on empirical evidence	Aim of the Article: The aim of the article is to develop a theory of hybrid warfare based on empirical evidence from the conflict in and around Ukraine and with Russia. It seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of hybrid forms of warfare and their implications for security policy in Europe.	The similarities are in Focus on Hybrid Warfare: Both the article focus on hybrid warfare, with my research specifically aiming to comprehensively explain the evolution of hybrid war strategy used by Ukraine. Then, the impact on Ukrainian Society, both works aim to assess the impact of hybrid warfare on Ukrainian society, including the civilian population, military personnel, and government agencies. The differences on Problem Formulation, while the article by Johann Schmid focuses on defining the nature of hybrid warfare and its characteristics, my research has specific problem formulations related to the impact of total mobilization efforts and the

				effectiveness of Ukraine's response to Russia's hybrid warfare tactics.
4	Nicholas Marsh (2023)	Responding To Needs: Military Aid to Ukraine During The First Year After The 2022 Invasion	The aim of this article is to analyze the provision of military aid to Ukraine during the first year after the 2022 Russian invasion. It seeks to examine the impact of material and intangible military assistance, discuss the tensions in the relationships between Ukraine and the states that provided support, and evaluate the effectiveness of the aid in strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities. The article also aims to highlight the importance of the quantity, quality, and speed of equipment provided, the training of Ukrainian troops, and the role of effective Ukrainian defense and government institutions in the success of the military aid.	<p>The similarities are as follows: Both studies focus on the military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, specifically the 2022 Russian invasion and Both examine the effectiveness of Ukraine's response to the invasion, and both studies consider the impact of the conflict on various sectors of Ukrainian society.</p> <p>The differences are as follows: My research focuses on the total mobilization efforts of Ukraine and how these efforts impact various sectors of Ukrainian society. This article, on the other hand, focuses on the provision of military aid to Ukraine and its impact on Ukraine's defense capabilities. My research aims to explain the evolution of the hybrid warfare strategy used by Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. This article does not delve into the specifics of Russia's warfare strategy but discusses the strategies of attrition used by both sides. My research seeks to evaluate the impact of total mobilization on Ukrainian society. This article, however, discusses the tensions in the relationships between Ukraine and the states that provided military aid.</p>

5	Albina Starodubtseva (2021)	Russian Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine: Comparative Analysis of Two Cases and Identification of Critical Elements in the Successful Application of Hybrid Tactics	The aim of this research is to examine the concept of Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine, specifically focusing on two cases: the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The research aims to compare these two cases and identify critical elements in the successful application of hybrid tactics. It also proposes recommendations for improving a state's ability to deal with hybrid attacks.	The similarities lie in the focus on the hybrid warfare strategy used by Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. Both studies aim to understand the evolution of this strategy and its impact on Ukraine. The differences lie in the specific focus and objectives of each study. My research is centered on the total mobilization efforts of Ukraine and their impact on various sectors of Ukrainian society, including the civilian population, military personnel, and government agencies. It also aims to evaluate the effectiveness of Ukraine's response to Russia's hybrid warfare tactics. On the other hand, this research focuses on comparing the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine to identify critical elements in the successful application of hybrid tactics. It also proposes recommendations for improving a state's ability to deal with hybrid attacks. In terms of methodology, while my research is qualitative, it is not clear from the provided information whether this research uses a qualitative, quantitative, or mixed-methods approach.
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Source: processed by researcher, (2023)

### 2.3 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework offers a structured outline of the researcher's logical thinking and serves as a guide for conducting research. It forms a cohesive link between the background of the problem, the theory, and the subsequent discussion. The framework helps the researcher organize the research data according to the identified problem and the research objectives. In addition, the theoretical framework explains the relationship between the variables in the study.

As input, all countries clearly have national interests as the main motivation for action. Based on these national interests, it is clear that each country will make all efforts to achieve its goals. One of the Russian state's national interests in Ukraine is to spread its influence. In order to achieve its interests, the Russian state uses a hybrid warfare strategy. Through this hybrid warfare, the Russian state succeeded in annexing Crimea, which is the territory of Ukraine. On the Ukrainian side, the process that occurred was a continuous conflict, a massive crisis in the Ukrainian State that forced Ukraine to respond by implementing a Deterrence strategy, in response to input that was in Ukraine's National Interest as a State that wanted to join NATO. In addition to making efforts to eliminate the opportunities of threatening state groups to carry out attacks, the Government of Ukraine also seeks to eliminate the capabilities of related state groups. In making this effort, there are several important things to focus on to be able to increase the success to be achieved, which is seen as an output. The first is Ukraine's focus on eliminating the opportunities and capabilities of threat state groups in response to the conflict, and the second is Ukraine's implementation of a Total Mobilization Strategy to increase success and achieve its national interests.

In the figure below, the input is "National Interest," which triggers processes along the path of Russia's hybrid warfare strategy, hybrid warfare implementation, deterrence perception, and Ukraine's response. The output

is Ukraine's implementation of a total mobilization strategy. All these elements are interrelated and form a coherent theoretical framework.



**Figure 2.2 Frame of Mind**

Source: processed by researcher, (2023)