


CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Africa has witnessed the highest number of armed conflicts worldwide in the post-cold war period. This phenomenon is still experienced in the contemporary period. These can be attributed to different causes ranging from wars of liberation, external interference, governance issues, border disputes, economic disparities unfair allocation of national resources and the spread of terrorism among other reasons. A determining factor in African security is the fact that a greater proportion comprise of small power states with limited resources and capacity to pursue their respective national interests and are therefore subject to external exploitation and interference in their domestic affairs. To that end they are subject to acting as proxies for big powers in their competition for international domination and the quest to exploit resources (Énio Viegas Filipe Chingotuane et al, October 2021).



- Major wars (10,000 or more)
- Wars (1,000–9,999)

- Minor conflicts (100–999)
- Skirmishes and clashes (10–99)

Figure 1.1 Map of ongoing armed conflicts in the world and the death toll associated with each conflict

Source: Reddit: List of ongoing armed conflicts around the world. June 2022.

Over the years, Africa has suffered from different forms of conflict, oppression and exploitation over time which included slave trade, marginalization, colonialism and imperialism among others. This resulted in the loss of African sovereignty, underdevelopment, weak economic and governance systems and prolonged poverty. Efforts at gaining sovereignty and international equality by individual states had been met with resistance by the developed world in their quest to maintain the existing status quo of their domination and beneficitation from Africa. In a bid to gain international leverage and ensure continental peace and security by the small power states, the African Union (AU) was formed in 2002 under the framework of collective security. Biereenu-Nuabugwu (2013) identifies regional integration as the panacea for Africa which would enable Africans to pool their resources as well as to speak from a common point of view thereby giving her the needed bargaining power in international affairs.

The founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which later transformed to AU marked Africa's transition towards regional integration, independence and sovereignty in decision making and implementation. The African Union is comprised of all the states of Africa except for Morocco. It has a total of 54 member states. The vision of the AU as captured in its Constitutive Act is to 'build an Africa that is integrated, prosperous and at peace, led by its citizens and constituting a dynamic force on the world stage'. Chief among the grouping's objectives is achieving greater unity and solidarity between African countries and African peoples; defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states and to accelerate the continent's political and socioeconomic union. It also seeks to promote peace, security and

stability on the continent and create the conditions necessary to enable the continent to play its rightful role in the world economy and international interactions. Its stated objectives are to:

- a. Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;
- b. Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;
- c. Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- d. Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;
- e. Encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- f. Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;
- g. Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
- h. Promote and protect human peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
- i. Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations;
- j. Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies;
- k. Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples;
- l. Coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union;

- m. Advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology; and
- n. Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act stresses state sovereignty and enshrines the continental group's rights to interfere in the internal affairs of a member under given circumstances. Particularly Articles 4(h) and (j) allows intervention in circumstances of crimes against humanity, war and in cases of genocide. On this basis member states are empowered to request for intervention in order to restore peace and security. However, of special note is that the structure of the AU comprises of sub-regional groupings which are operationally responsible for respective regional security under the oversight of the AU which will in turn be operating under the UN. There are eight regional communities which function as the pillars of the union and are responsible for the implementation of the AU's tasks and mandates. These comprise of the Community of Sahel–Saharan States, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Economic Community of West African states, East African Community, Economic Community of West African states, Arab Maghreb Union, Inter-governmental Authority on Development and Southern African Development Community (SADC). It is the mandate of the regional community to address issues within its area of responsibility under the umbrella of the AU. This paper will limit its focus on SADC, in particular, its defence capacity building measures in reaction to the terrorist challenge in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province.



Figure 1.2 Map of SADC member states

Source; Southern African Development Community: Member States.
<https://www.sadc.int/member-states>. June 2022.

SADC is responsible for implementing AU resolutions within the southern region of Africa and it comprises of 16 member states namely: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, United Republic Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its main objectives include achieving regional peace and security as well as to protect people from instability caused by the collapse of law and order, cooperating on defence and security issues, poverty alleviation, promoting democratic principles of governance and sustainable development among others. (SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security: 2012).

1.1.1 Terrorism in Mozambique

According to Rosario et al (2021) Mozambique's rebel problem has evolved over decades, dating back at least to its independence in

1975. Despite being rich in natural resources, Cabo Delgado remains one of the least developed provinces in the country with a hefty illegal economy. This was in part due to Africa's shared development challenges, Mozambique government's distraction by years of civil war, and exploitative government policies. Resultantly, the terrorist group, *Ansar al-Sunna* (also referred to as IS-Moz) is believed to have its origins from an Islamic sect that started 2007 in protest against the economic marginalisation of the province and became increasingly violent over time. The aim of the terrorists is the creation of an Islamic State of Mozambique. Several factors can be attributed to the growth of violent extremism within the province. It is the least developed province in Mozambique regardless of the fact that it holds the largest array of natural resources which have been exploited for the benefit of the elite in Maputo the capital city. This factor is exacerbated by the religious makeup whereby Cabo Delgado is predominantly Muslim while Maputo is largely Christian. The region also holds large reserves of liquified natural gas (LNG) valued at more than US\$50 billion and have been exploited by foreign energy companies like British Petroleum (BP) Shell without any benefits to the local community (Rosario et al: 2021).

The other grievance stemmed from the fact that the Mozambican government remained a Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) controlled institution, with liberation-era leaders in power since independence was won. FRELIMO has also been accused of suppressing local authorities and adopting a system of governance in which the public has too little say as well as running a highly centralized government. Although the opposition political party Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) pushed for decentralization and succeeded in expanding the powers of the governor, the balance of power between Maputo and the capital remained largely unchanged, suggesting dictatorship and a lack of democracy.

Cabo Delgado businesses have been dominated on partisanship by generals from the FRELIMO party the majority of whom are from the Makonde tribe. Local officials also engage in rampant corruption in trading illicit gems, drugs and wildlife turning the province into an international transit point for heroin. The local small-scale artisan miners were forcibly removed from the ruby fields of Montepuez by the national government in 2014 stirring resentment and unrest. The challenges of massive relocation and employment opportunities created by the development of natural gas infrastructure in the province were yet to be addressed by the administrators in Maputo. The grievances of the local populace who had been affected while being promised substantive benefits were wallowing in poverty and the government seemed to have forgotten about them. The Frelimo liberation veterans enjoy a monopoly in policy making and they used this to promote their party and individual interests at the expense of the local populace of the Cabo Delgado province which was the source of their riches. Thus, it can be argued that the insurgency problem was a result of internal policy as influenced by Frelimo party stalwarts as the main actors (Zenn, 2020).

The founding of Ansar al-Sunnah has also been attributed to non-conducive domestic policies that have led to poverty, inequality, discrimination, exclusion, frustration of the youth and dearth of socio-economic opportunities resulting from prolonged conflict. This was exacerbated by the Mozambique's economy which was slowing when the first militant attacks were recorded in 2017. According to the African Development Bank (2018), Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth was 3.8% in 2016 and 3.7% in 2017, in comparison to an average of 7.3% growth over the last decade. Mozambique's total public sector debt amounted to 112% of the country's GDP in 2017, well above the debt sustainability threshold. As for poverty rates, 46.1% of the population lived below the national poverty line in 2017. Economic governance has deteriorated, with a score of 3.3 in 2017, down from 3.6 in 2016 as ranked

according to the African Development Bank's assessment of country policies and institutions. Unemployment among the youth was 41.7% in 2017. Safe sanitation facilities were accessible to a meagre 20.5% of the populace and the national grid serviced only 29%. In 2017, food insecurity threatened about 20% of the populace while malnutrition and hunger affected a quarter of the nation ([applewebdata://D89FC7D9-BA8A-4E6A-9CFD-B099ECD5B788/ - edn16](applewebdata://D89FC7D9-BA8A-4E6A-9CFD-B099ECD5B788/-_edn16)).

The Ansar al-Sunna terrorist group also claims that the type of Islam being practiced in Mozambique does not follow the teachings of Muhammad. They entered traditional mosques with arms and threatened the followers to adopt their own radical beliefs. They also tried to prevent people from attending schools and hospitals claiming that they are anti-Islamic and secular. They also called for the establishment of an Islamic State, propagated for the adoption of Sharia Law and no longer recognised the Maputo government. They became more and more violent in their efforts to convert the locals, which instead alienated much of the locals (Jasmine Opperman: 31 May 2018).

Starting from 5 October 2017 the terrorists launched violent attacks on security forces, government installations and the general populace within the Cabo Delgado region. These include attacks on police stations, theft of firearms, violent killings and the capture of the town of Mocimboa da Praia. (*Dailymaverick.co.za*. 27 October 2017). The violent attacks continued to grow and become more gruesome over time and by 2020 the terrorists had killed more than 3,000 inhabitants and caused the displacement of almost 800,000, with 50% comprising of children. The economy of the region was also adversely affected with businesses closing including the indefinite suspension of a US\$20 billion Total LNG project (United States Institute of Peace: 23 June 2022).

1.1.2 Government Response

In response to the outbreak of terrorist violence in Cabo Delgado the Mozambique government deployed a special rapid reaction unit, the *Unidade Intervenção Rápida*, beefed by the military, the Rapid Reaction Unit, Mozambique Republic Police and the National Criminal Investigative Services to conduct counterinsurgency operations (Club of Mozambique, 2020). However, as the government has been influenced by foreign pressure to prioritise economic development ahead of defence capacity building, the reaction force was ill-equipped, insufficiently trained and subject to low morale. Resultantly they suffered heavy casualties after which they started refusing to defend the terrorist strong points such as Mocimboa da Praia (Tony Blair Institute for Global Change: 2020).

In addition to the lack of resources, coordination and operational preparedness, the government adopted a denialist attitude to the international community by downplaying the seriousness of the problem and portraying the attacks as a fictitious foreign conspiracy designed to smear the government and enhance its exploitation. They denied the existence of local grievances against the government within the Cabo Delgado community. Both foreign and local journalists seeking to report on the true state of affairs on the ground were either repressed, detained or expelled outright. Even though the Mozambique government was aware of its inadequate capacity to contain the Ansar al-Sunna threat, it was hesitant to accept or request for military support from its SADC counterparts until the situation had grown out of hand (Makonye: 2020).

Concerns about its national sovereignty appear to have been the key reason for the Mozambican government's resistance. The deployment of foreign troops in a nation is internationally a sensitive issue from the standpoint of national sovereignty and is usually adopted as an option of last resort. The Terrorism Monitor (2018) is of the opinion the ruling socialist FRELIMO party has long held concerns against relying on external aid due to fear of potential imperialism that may arise. This may

be explained by lessons learned during Mozambique's 16-year civil conflict, in which regional and local proxies played a crucial role. The authorities also believed Tanzania, a neighbour, was funding the terrorist organization Ansar al-Sunna. The local security forces were obviously unable to defeat the threat presented by Ansar al-Sunna on their own, but the government was opposed to any outside assistance and preferred the hiring of private military firms (PMCs). This was regardless of the potential threat of the terrorist insurrection in Mozambique causing widespread instability and insecurity in the whole region, as well as the fact that a key objective of SADC (which Mozambique is a member) is the collective promotion of national and regional peace and security as stated under Article 5 of the SADC Treaty of 1992 and further articulated under Article 2 of the SADC Protocol on Defence and Security 2012 (SADC 2015).

According to Baptista and Kajjo (2020), 200 members of the Russian Wagner group allegedly entered the nation in September 2019 to train and assist Mozambican forces in Cabo Delgado, although their involvement was only temporary. The group suffered a number of casualties during its initial deployment, and after suffering terrible losses in November 2019, it was eventually compelled to withdraw from the province. Despite this terrible event, Maputo stuck to its plan and in April 2020 contacted the South African Dyck Advisory Group (DAG). Even though it experienced a rough start, the organization later gained some notoriety for their assistance during the attack in Palma in March 2021. Even though the operation was deemed successful in Palma, the contract eventually expired in April 2021.

The province witnessed a significant rise in the rate and intensity of Ansar al-Sunna attacks over the PMCs' intervention period, with over 570 incidents being witnessed in 2020. According to Baptista and Kajjo (2020), around 200 members of the Islamist militants were able to undertake deadly raids on significant towns like Mocimboa de Praia, Macomia, and Namacande, highlighting the incapacity of PMCs and the

national security apparatus to curtail the continuation of the violence. These inconsistent outcomes had been thought to have been caused by a assortment of aspects, including lack of understanding of the local terrain, which is reportedly particularly difficult in the isolated and poorly connected north-eastern province, logistical and technical difficulties, and an inability to effectively coordinate with domestic forces. According to Zitamar News (8 June 2020), Wagner's ability to conduct operations was thought to have been hampered by rising hostilities with the national defence forces as a result of certain unsuccessful operations.

It was apparent that Mozambique lacked the training, military intelligence, equipment, tactics and reconnaissance capacities necessary to successfully contain and subdue the terrorists. In light of this, and in accordance with the SADC Treaty and other pertinent SADC and AU agreements, it was decided that SADC's engagement was not only inevitable but also mandatory. Other strong political and security reasons also support SADC engagement in Mozambique. The worry that the terrorist problem will expand throughout the region if it wasn't promptly resolved was crucial to this thought process. In addition, the threat had the potential to disrupt regional peace and security through proliferation of refugees, disruption of supply chains, hunger, poverty, human rights abuse, etc (Baptista and Kajjo; 2020).

In reaction to the worsening terrorist situation, the government of Mozambique stepped down from its policy standpoint of suspicion and lack of trust in regional military intervention and requested for assistance and support from SADC on 19 May 2020 during the SADC Extra-Ordinary Organ Troika Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Harare, Zimbabwe. SADC constituted a technical fact-finding team to recommend on the best way forward. The team recommended the deployment of a joint military force comprised of 3000 air, land and naval capabilities as guided by the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (SADC, 2021).

SADC had to contend with Mozambique government's reluctance to request for external assistance in internal affairs through permitting foreign soldiers on sovereign territory. Legal justification and implications for such military intervention were hotly contested before the announcement, especially in the delay or lack of Mozambican government approval, a situation which would have forced SADC to resort to act only on the basis of a UN Security Council resolution. Historically, the SADC has never conducted an operation without the permission of the host nation before. Additionally, it has been assumed that there would be agreement because the declaration was made during a conference that was hosted and presided over by Mozambique (Gartenstein, Chace, and Clarke; 2021).

Despite the fact that SADC Mission to Mozambique (SAMIM) was supposed to commence deployment on July 15, the planned schedule encountered several setbacks. These were related to the Status of Forces Agreement, which had to be signed by the Mozambican government in order for foreign forces to be deployed in the nation. The deployment was a first for the regional grouping in many ways and was unlike the 1990s interventions in Lesotho and the DRC where deployment preceded SADC authorization.

1.1.3 Rationale, Role and Justification for SADC Intervention

Given the worsening terrorist situation in Cabo Delgado, of particular being the intensifying killings, kidnappings and displacement of civilians, human abuses committed by terrorists against their victims, disruption of economic activity, threat to regional security and the potential economic impact on the continued operations of the LNG project, there was sufficient justification for SADC to intervene in view of Mozambique's lack of defence capacity. In addition to being a member of SADC, Mozambique has separate bilateral security agreements with various

African countries like Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and South Africa which could be relied upon to boost its capacity.

There are six important factors that justify the SADC intervention in Mozambique. First, SADC Member States have a legal and moral obligation arising from the United Nations responsibility to protect principle to assist other Member States in the face of security threats and challenges as a key goal of the SADC, as outlined in Article 5 of the 1992 SADC Treaty, is to promote peace and security (SADC, 2015). On the other hand, under Article 2, the SADC Protocol on Politics, National Defence and Security also stipulates that Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Committee (OPDSC) will safeguard the people and protect the development of the region against instability caused by disruption of public order and internal conflicts. It also obliges the OPDSC to foil, control, and settle interstate and internal conflicts preferably through peaceful means, and allows cooperation between the police and state security services to promote these means through community-based approach to national security (SADC, 2001).

The other justification arises from the commitments made by SADC member states through various instruments under the AU influencing their respective foreign policies. These consist of the OAU Resolution of 1992 providing for on the Consolidation of Collaboration and Harmonization among African States, OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism of 1999, the AU Plan of Action for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2002) and the AU Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2004), which all mandate African nations to cooperate against insurgency and terrorism. Basing upon the international law concept of, *pacta sunt servanda* SADC was rightfully obliged to sustain the spirit of these AU agreements by intervening in Cabo Delgado. Additionally, in 2013 SADC member nations pledged cooperation in eradicating all civil conflicts, wars, and breaches of

human rights under one the AU's Agenda 2063 project termed "Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020" (African Union, 2017).

Thirdly, the Government of Mozambique had evoked Article 11(4) of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security to request for support and assistance from fellow SADC member states to boost its capacity to deal with the growing terrorist threat. The government of Mozambique officially requested for capacity building during the SADC Extra-Ordinary Organ Troika Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 19 May 2020 (SADC, 2020). This gave SADC the legal justification to capacitate Mozambique within the parameters of its request which included humanitarian and logistical capacity building as well as the practical deployment of troops to boost the local security forces.

The fourth factor which influenced SADC involvement in Mozambique was that the insurrection was endangering regional stability and peace. According to Article 11(2)(b) of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security, a conflict that is a threat to regional peace and security or on the territorial jurisdiction of another nation qualifies as justification for joint SADC action. If terrorism in Mozambique is not stopped, chances are very high that it would spill into neighbouring nations such as Zambia, Eswatini, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi. The terrorist situation in Mozambique had the potential to destabilize the region, undo regional peace benefits, and exacerbate the flow of internally displaced people into its neighbours and disrupt the natural gas project (DefenceWeb, 2020).

The fifth determinant was that previous terrorist outbreaks such as Somalia's Al-Shabaab, the Boko Haram of Nigeria, ISIS in Libya, and other insurgency and terrorism experiences from the past have taught Africa valuable lessons the tendency of terrorist groups to rapidly enlarge their influence, recruitment bases as well as sophistication if they are not contained during their inception. Terrorists do not recognise no respect

national borders but actually take advantage of them to establish safe havens into which they can withdraw when attacked in one nation. This therefore calls for coordinated efforts by all parties affected in order to come up with a lasting solution. The Mozambique terrorists were already expanding across borders to conduct raids in neighbouring Tanzania's territory by October 2020 prompting the two nations to sign an MOU facilitating security cooperation along the shared boarder (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 2020).

The sixth factor, which constitutes the main problem is that by November 2020, the Ansar al-Sunna terrorists in Cabo Delgado had killed over 2 400 people, uprooted more than 500 000 inhabitants, hindered economic activity, and exacerbated food insecurity. Along with this, there was a humanitarian crisis in Cabo Delgado mainly affecting the displaced civilians, in particular children, women, the elderly, and people with disabilities and illnesses (UNOCHA; 2020). However, faced with this ever-growing attack on peace, security and human life, the major challenge was that the Mozambique security apparatus lacked the capacity and resources to curb it. Efforts by the security forces had failed to control the situation and it was expanding with a potential of engulfing the whole nation and even spilling into neighbouring states. On that basis, the obtaining internal security situation in Mozambique qualified and satisfied the conditions obliging SADC to actively intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign member. This is based on the three pillars of the Responsibility to Protect principle which provides that each state is obligated to safeguard its inhabitants from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, states agree to support one another in carrying out their protection obligations; and if any state is "manifestly failing" in these obligations, then states should act jointly to protect the population. Article 11(2)(b) of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security obligates the SADC OPDSC to adopt efforts towards resolution of violence between segments of the populace, or

between the state and parts of its subjects and in instances of a civil war or insurgency situation (SADC, 2001). Thus, apart from a legal standing arising from legal instruments as basis for SADC intervention in Mozambique, the sub-regional group was also morally obligated to assist the general populace against continued murder, pillage, abuse, displacement and the suffering occasioned by the terrorist atrocities.

1.2 Focus and Sub-focus

1.2.1 Focus

The research is focused on an in-depth analysis of the application and effectiveness of defence capacity building mechanisms initiated by SADC member states in reaction to terrorism in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique. SADC Member States have a legal and moral obligation arising from the United Nations responsibility to protect principle to assist other Member States in the face of security threats and challenges as a key goal of the SADC, as outlined in Article 5 of the 1992 SADC Treaty, is to promote peace and security (SADC, 2015). On the other hand, under Article 2, the SADC Protocol on Politics, National Defence and Security also stipulates that OPDSC will safeguard the people and protect the development of the region against instability caused by disruption of public order and internal conflicts. It also obliges the OPDSC to foil, control, and settle interstate and internal conflicts preferably through peaceful means, and allows cooperation between the police and state security services to promote these means through community-based approach to national security (SADC, 2001). Of interest is the fact that the member states themselves are all small power nations with limited respective national capacities. The SADC defence capacity building initiative's motivation is to concentrate assistance when currently available mechanisms cannot meet the scope and objectives of planned collaboration in order to provide tailored, efficient defence and related

security sector assistance with the strong political support of the allies' governments.

The outbreak of the Al-Sunnah terrorism in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique and the concerted efforts by the SADC regional grouping provides an opportunity to analyse the defence capacity building patterns of the small powers. As a result of deficiency of resources to provide leeway for the pre-development of national resilience, small powers are known to resort to reactive approach to situations, threats or crisis. After the failure of Mozambique to curb the terrorist outbreak it sought allied assistance from its SADC member states resulting in foreign nations intervention to bolster internal defence capacities in the Cabo Delgado province.



Figure 1.3 Map of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado and Neighbour States

Source: R Mashimbye, (2022). Terrorism, Insurgency, and Regional Stability: The Case of Mozambique

1.2.2 Sub-focus

The research's sub-focus is on the attainment of peace and security through the development of trust as the foundation for building and implementing effective and enduring defence capacity building initiatives among member states of a community. It shall analyse the categories of SADC DCB initiatives in support of Mozambique, their nature, amount, appropriateness and their impact on the Ansar Al Sunna terrorists in Cabo Delgado province.

1.3 Problem Formulation

According to the US Institute of Peace (June 23, 2022) the violent Ansar al-Sunna terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado continued to grow and become more gruesome over time and by July 2020 the terrorists had killed more than 3,000 civilians while causing the displacement of almost 800,000, of which 50% were children. It was also spreading into neighbouring countries such as Tanzania. The local security forces were failing to deal with the situation resulting in the Mozambique government requesting for assistance from SADC. The SADC Protocols obligates member states to assist a member when it is failing to protect its population, however, a major weakness in the structure is that there are no laid down parameters guiding the nature, amount, suitability and duration of assistance expected from each member state.

Even though SADC operates under the auspices of the UN, it has a different structural makeup. All member nations of SADC enjoy equal powers within the institute and SADC does not have a standing peace keeping force as is the case with the UN therefore its reactions are on ad hoc basis as need arises. Resultantly member states individually determine the level of capacity building they contribute and some may choose to abstain. In the absence of clearly laid down parameters of capacity building, it is not possible to make authoritative assumptions regarding the nature, amount, suitability, duration and timeliness of the

assistance given by member states. There is also no guarantee that the assistance rendered will be appropriate, adequate, timely, etc. Thus, this research shall seek to determine the nature, amount, duration and suitability of the assistance proffered and analyse its impact on the terrorist situation in Cabo Delgado province.

The focus of discussion of this paper aims at answering the following questions:

- a. How did SADC build the defence capacities of Mozambique with the aim of containing terrorism in Cabo Delgado province?
- b. How effective were the SADC defence capacity building initiatives in enabling Mozambique to react to the terrorist situation?

1.4 Research Objectives

Basing upon the problem highlighted, the objectives of this study are:

- a. To analyse SADC's practical application of defence capacity building measures in reaction to terrorism in Mozambique.
- b. To determine the effectiveness of the defence capacity building initiatives adopted by SADC in assisting Mozambique to deal with terrorism in Cabo Delgado province.

1.5 Research Benefits

1.5.1 Theoretical Benefits

The results of this study are expected to benefit scientific research as a basis for the development of theories and understanding DCB patterns of third world countries within the context of regional integration and collective security. It will also serve as reference material to steer future operations of a similar nature. The observations made are

expected to contribute to the available literature bridging the gap between theoretical concepts and their practical application in the theatre of operations in the face of the growing menace of terrorism as an international threat to security.

1.5.2 Practical Benefits

This research can be useful to SADC and other regional security groupings by enriching their body of knowledge regarding the correlation between theories, policies, strategies and the practical application of DCB initiatives and their expected outcomes. The study is also set to assist SADC to refine its procedures, strategies and capacities to be more fit for role given that it has a pivotal mandate towards the attainment of regional integration, peace and security. The research would also be used by other researchers in future as reference material.